Kirk v. City of New York involved a challenge to the constitutionality of two provisions of the New York state criminal code, which were alleged to deny individuals their First Amendment right to free speech. The two challenged sections prohibited “obstructing or interfering with” public streets and sidewalks, and “impeding the progress or passage” of any person on public streets or sidewalks. In their complaint, plaintiffs claimed that these statutes violated their rights under the First Amendment because they could be interpreted too broadly and applied in ways that might violate an individual’s freedom of expression.
Law Analysis on Kirk, et al text,
The district court initially granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that the statutes do not facially violate the First Amendment because they are narrowly tailored regulations designed to protect public safety and convenience. However, in their appeal before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiffs argued that even if these statutes may be valid restrictions on conduct generally – such as blocking traffic – they should still have been struck down under intermediate scrutiny analysis because there was no evidence presented indicating why more limited speech-restrictive measures would not suffice for achieving this purpose.
To begin its analysis, the court noted that content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions on free speech must satisfy three requirements: (1) they must serve an important government interest; (2) they must be narrowly tailored enough so as not to burden substantially more speech than necessary; and (3) they leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Applying this test here, it found that both challenged statutes served an important governmental interest – maintaining safe public areas – but then concluded that neither statute was sufficiently narrowly tailored with respect to its burden on free expression since each encompasses a much broader range of activities than necessary in order achieve this objective; thus allowing for potential unconstitutional application against protected expression activity by a reasonable person who is aware of all relevant facts at hand.
The court cited several prior cases involving similar facial challenges where courts had struck down overly broad statutes as unconstitutional because such laws fail to adequately provide notice about what types of conduct are proscribed. This decision highlighted Edwards v. South Carolina, where after examining a statute prohibiting assemblies “with intent [to]… disturb peace”, Justice Harlan wrote: “[w]e cannot hold persons guilty upon accusations founded merely upon inference from acts which are innocent in themselves… It is thus essential in every case [that] one charged with [such violations] shall have fair warning…of what he must avoid”. Similarly here too, given how vague these New York criminal code provisions potentially could be applied against expressive behavior outside what is necessary for protecting public safety interests, therefore rendering them insufficiently clear warnings against constitutionally protected conduct requiring strict scrutiny review according Judd v City Of Toledo.. Consequently due to lack narrow tailoring aspect , both penal codes eventually got declared unconstitutional by 2nd circuit panel .
Overall although both sides made compelling arguments , ultimately due tight parameters around first amendment justice based out past precedent it was deemed necessary by appellate court strike down overly broad penal codes enacted by New york state legislature being used curb certain expressions .
 See Powe v City Of Chicago Ill., 664 F3d 939(7th cir 2011); Turner Broad Sys Inc V FCC 512 U S 622(1994).
 Edwards v South Carolina 372 U S 229(1963).
See Members Of City Council V Taxpayers For Vincent 466 US 789(1984);Edwards V South Carolina 372 Us 229.(1963). Judd V City Of Toledo Ohio 101 F 3d 1299.(6th Cir 1996).